Evaluating Cybersecurity Risks of Bulgaria’s Energy Sector: Focus on PV and HVAC-R
Source abstract
Abstract
Photovoltaics with energy storage are the current trend in solar energy. Hybrid inverters are the backbone of low-power installations of this type. If a single installation is compromised, there are no significant security concerns. However, multiple devices can be targeted simultaneously. Taking into account their increasing share in the energy mix, distributed cyber-attacks against these devices can threaten grid stability. The Bulgarian electric power system has been analyzed in order to determine its development which is in line with EU-wide trends. It can be concluded that hybrid inverters are expected to grow rapidly in number and in installed power. The vulnerability of hybrid inverters to cyber-attacks has been analyzed, and the possible consequences for the energy system have been identified. The technology allows it to be used as a hybrid means of influence, and this aspect is poorly addressed in existing cybersecurity regulations. A risk assessment has been made, based on which measures to improve security have been proposed.
Source: crossref · Quality: baseline
Research context
OpenAlex topics: Smart Grid Security and Resilience · Energy and Environment Impacts · Global Energy Security and Policy
SciVX discovery tags are terminology-based. OpenAlex topics are source-provided classifications.
Affiliations
Department of Electrical Supply, Electrical Equipment and Electrical Transport, Faculty of Electrical Engineering, Technical University of Sofia, 1000 Sofia, Bulgaria
Department of Electric Power Distribution and Electrical Equipment, Faculty of Electrical Engineering and Electronics, Technical University of Gabrovo, 5300 Gabrovo, Bulgaria
Funding
European Regional Development Fund within the Operational Programme “Bulgarian national recovery and resilience plan”
References (81)
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