Anomaly Detection for Substations Based on IEC 61850-NFA Model
Source abstract
Abstract
The increasing digitalization of energy transmission and distribution infrastructures has made industrial control systems (ICS), and especially IEC 61850-based communication structures, critical. IEC 61850 performs protection and control functions in substations in real time via GOOSE and MMS protocols. The fast and low-latency operation of these protocols is essential; however, their open structure leaves systems vulnerable to cyberattacks. Traditional signature-based solutions are insufficient for detecting such anomalies, and models capable of learning both time and state relationships are needed. This study develops a time-aware probabilistic NFA model to detect anomalous behavior in IEC 61850 traffic. The model analyzes GOOSE and MMS message sequences with both state transitions and time differences (Δt). Thus, not only the message sequence but also the timing variations between events are learned. The probability of each transition is dynamically updated, and deviations from normal behavior are marked as “anomalies”. The dataset used in this study was created based on normal and attack scenarios conducted in the Sakarya University Critical Infrastructure National Testbed Center Energy Laboratory (Center Energy). The experimental results obtained in the study show that the model detects time-based, structural, and behavioral anomalies with high accuracy. With a dual-model configuration, results of 91.7% accuracy, 88.9% precision, 100% recall, and a 94.1% F1-score were achieved; particularly in time-based attack scenarios, the model performance reached an accuracy level of up to 93%.
Source: crossref · Quality: baseline
Research context
OpenAlex topics: Smart Grid Security and Resilience · Electricity Theft Detection Techniques · Anomaly Detection Techniques and Applications
SciVX discovery tags are terminology-based. OpenAlex topics are source-provided classifications.
Affiliations
Computer Engineering, Cyber Security, Sakarya University, Serdivan 54050, Türkiye
Cyber Security Engineering, Sakarya University, Serdivan 54050, Türkiye
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