Single Trace Analysis against HyMES by Exploitation of Joint Distributions of Leakages
Source abstract
Abstract
Beginning with the proposal of the McEliece cryptosystem in 1978, code-based cryptography has positioned itself as one of main categories in post-quantum cryptography (PQC). To date, the algebraic security of certain variants of McEliece cryptosystems has been challenged many times, although some of the variants have remained secure. However, recent studies on code-based cryptography have focused on the side-channel resistance since previous studies have indicated that the existing algorithms were vulnerable to side-channel analysis. In this paper, we propose the first side-channel attack on the Hybrid McEliece Scheme (HyMES) using only a single power consumption trace. HyMES is a variant of the McEliece system that provides smaller keys, along with faster encryption and decryption speed. By exploiting joint distributions of nonlinear functions in the decryption process, we were able to recover the private key of HyMES. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work proposing a side-channel analysis based on a joint distribution of the leakages on the public-key system.
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Research context
OpenAlex topics: Coding theory and cryptography · Cryptographic Implementations and Security · Chaos-based Image/Signal Encryption
SciVX discovery tags are terminology-based. OpenAlex topics are source-provided classifications.
Affiliations
Center for Information Security Technologies (CIST), Korea University, Seoul 02841, Korea
Department of Cyber Security, College of Science and Technology, Korea University, Sejong 30019, Korea
Department of Information Security, Cryptology, and Mathematics, Kookmin University, Seoul 02707, Korea
Funding
Ministry of Science and ICT
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