Binary-Tree-Fed Mixnet: An Efficient Symmetric Encryption Solution
Source abstract
Abstract
Mixnets are an instrument to achieve anonymity. They are generally a sequence of servers that apply a cryptographic process and a permutation to a batch of user messages. Most use asymmetric cryptography, with the high computational cost that this entails. The main objective of this study is to reduce delay in mixnet nodes. In this sense, this paper presents a new scheme that is based only on symmetric cryptography. The novelty of this scheme is the use of binary graphs built by mixnet nodes. The root node collects user keys and labels without knowing their owners. After feeding each node by its graph, they can establish a random permutation and relate their keys to the incoming batch positions through labels. The differences with previous symmetric schemes are that users do not need long headers and nodes avoid the searching process. The outcomes are security and efficiency improvements. As far as we know, it is the fastest mixnet system. Therefore, it is appropriate for high-throughput applications like national polls (many users) or debates (many messages).
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Research context
OpenAlex topics: Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting · Advanced Steganography and Watermarking Techniques · Network Security and Intrusion Detection
SciVX discovery tags are terminology-based. OpenAlex topics are source-provided classifications.
Affiliations
Department of Electrical Engineering, Computing and Automatics, Escuela Técnica Superior de Ingeniería, Universidad de Huelva, Campus El Carmen, Avda. de las Fuerzas Armadas, s/n, 21007 Huelva, Spain
Department of Electrical Engineering, Escuela Técnica Superior de Ingeniería, Universidad de Huelva, Campus El Carmen, Avda. de las Fuerzas Armadas, s/n, 21007 Huelva, Spain
Department of Electrical Engineering, Escuela Politécnica Superior de Linares, Universidad de Jaén, Avda. de la Universidad s/n, 23700 Linares, Spain
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