An Array Antenna-Based Attitude Determination Method for GNSS Spoofing Mitigation in Power System Timing Applications

Accurate GNSS timing is fundamental to Power Time Synchronization Systems (PTSS). However, conventional substation infrastructures remain vulnerable to sophisticated spoofing attacks. In this research, a sensing-assisted array antenna-based spoofing mitigation method is proposed. The proposed architecture operates at the signal front-end and incorporates a dedicated spoofing sensing path to estimate the Direction-of-Arrival (DoA) of malicious signals, enabling adaptive null steering while preserving authentic satellite reception. To provide reliable spatial reference for DoA estimation, a unified high-precision attitude determination method is developed for compact 10 cm-scale array antennas under single-frequency and environmental error conditions. The method integrates the Constrained Least-squares AMBiguity Decorrelation Adjustment (C-LAMBDA)-based constrained ambiguity resolution, redundant antenna element-based vertical accuracy enhancement, and iterative refinement to mitigate centimeter-level environmental biases. Semi-simulated experiments demonstrate that the proposed method achieves baseline vector Root Mean Square Errors (RMSE) below 5 mm in horizontal components and approximately 10 mm in vertical components. The resulting attitude accuracies reach 2° in heading, 6° in pitch, and 4° in roll, while eliminating over 80% of systematic environmental phase errors with an average convergence within 6 iterations. These results satisfy the spatial accuracy requirements for effective spoofing suppression and front-end signal purification. Consequently, a robust technical approach is established for enhancing the anti-spoofing capabilities of PTSS without modifying existing infrastructure.