journal article·2021-10-25Open access

Contact Tracing: Ensuring Privacy and Security

Daan Storm van Leeuwen, Ali Ahmed, Craig Watterson, Nilufar Baghaei

Applied Sciences· Volume 11· Issue 21

Abstract

Faced with the biggest virus outbreak in a century, world governments at the start of 2020 took unprecedented measures to protect their healthcare systems from being overwhelmed in the light of the COVID-19 pandemic. International travel was halted and lockdowns were imposed. Many nations adopted measures to stop the transmission of the virus, such as imposing the wearing of face masks, social distancing, and limits on social gatherings. Technology was quickly developed for mobile phones, allowing governments to track people’s movements concerning locations of the virus (both people and places). These are called contact tracing applications. Contact tracing applications raise serious privacy and security concerns. Within Europe, two systems evolved: a centralised system, which calculates risk on a central server, and a decentralised system, which calculates risk on the users’ handset. This study examined both systems from a threat perspective to design a framework that enables privacy and security for contact tracing applications. Such a framework is helpful for App developers. The study found that even though both systems comply with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Europe’s privacy legislation, the centralised system suffers from severe risks against the threats identified. Experiments, research, and reviews tested the decentralised system in various settings but found that it performs better but still suffers from inherent shortcomings. User tracking and re-identification are possible, especially when users report themselves as infected. Based on these data, the study identified and validated a framework that enables privacy and security. The study also found that the current implementations using the decentralised Google/Apple API do not comply with the framework.
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Research context

OpenAlex topics: COVID-19 Digital Contact Tracing · Privacy, Security, and Data Protection · Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data

SciVX discovery tags are terminology-based. OpenAlex topics are source-provided classifications.

Affiliations

Department of Computer Science, University of Liverpool, Liverpool 11341, UK

School of Engineering and Computer Science, Victoria University of Wellington, P.O. Box 600, Wellington 6140, New Zealand

School of Natural & Computational Sciences, Massey University, Auckland 0745, New Zealand

School of Information Technology and Electrical Engineering, University of Queensland, St Lucia, QLD 4072, Australia

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