An AOP-Based Security Verification Environment for KECCAK Hash燗lgorithm

Robustness of the electronic cryptographic devices against fault injection attacks is a great concern to ensure security. Due to significant resource constraints, these devices are limited in their capabilities. The increasing complexity of cryptographic devices necessitates the development of a fast simulation environment capable of performing security tests against fault injection attacks. SystemC is a good choice for Electronic System Level (ESL) modeling since it enables models to run at a faster rate. To enable fault injection and detection inside a SystemC cryptographic model, however, the model’s source code must be updated. Without altering the source code, Aspect-Oriented Programming (AOP) may be used to evaluate the robustness of cryptographic models. This might replace conventional cryptanalysis methods in the real world. At the ESL, we discuss a unique technique for simulating security fault attacks on cryptographic systems. The current study presents a fault injection/detection environment for assessing the KECCAK SystemC model’s resistance against fault injection attacks. The approach of injecting faults into KECCAK SystemC model is accomplished via the use of weaving faults in AspectC++ based on AOP programming language. We confirm our technique by applying it to two scenarios using a SystemC KECCAK hash algorithm case study: The first concerns discuss the effect of the AOP on fault detection capabilities, while the second concerns discuss the effect of the AOP on simulation time and executable file size. The simulation results demonstrate that this technique is fully capable of evaluating the fault injection resistance of a KECCAK design. They demonstrate that AOP has a negligible effect on simulation time and executable file size.