Robust Authentication and Session Key Agreement Protocol for Satellite Communications

Satellite networks are recognized as the most essential communication infrastructures in the world today, which complement land networks and provide valuable services for their users. Extensive coverage and service stability of these networks have increased their popularity. Since eavesdropping and active intrusion in satellite communications are much easier than in terrestrial networks, securing satellite communications is vital. So far, several protocols have been proposed for authentication and key exchange of satellite communications, but none of them fully meet the security requirements. In this paper, we examine one of these protocols and identify its security vulnerabilities. Moreover, we propose a robust and secure authentication and session key agreement protocol using the elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). We show that the proposed protocol meets common security requirements and is resistant to known security attacks. Moreover, we prove that the proposed scheme satisfies the security features using the Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA) formal verification tool and On-the fly Model-Checker (OFMC) and ATtack SEarcher (ATSE) model checkers. We have also proved the security of the session key exchange of our protocol using the Real or Random (RoR) model. Finally, the comparison of our scheme with similar methods shows its superiority.