Programmable Logic Controller Block Monitoring System for Memory Attack Defense in Industrial Control Systems
Source abstract
Abstract
Cyberattacks targeting industrial control systems (ICS) are becoming more sophisticated and advanced than in the past. A programmable logic controller (PLC), a core component of ICS, controls and monitors sensors and actuators in the field. However, PLC has memory attack threats such as program injection and manipulation, which has long been a major target for attackers, and it is important to detect these attacks for ICS security. To detect PLC memory attacks, a security system is required to acquire and monitor PLC memory directly. In addition, the performance impact of the security system on the PLC makes it difficult to apply to the ICS. To address these challenges, this paper proposes a system to detect PLC memory attacks by continuously acquiring and monitoring PLC memory. The proposed system detects PLC memory attacks by acquiring the program blocks and block information directly from the same layer as the PLC and then comparing them in bytes with previous data. Experiments with Siemens S7-300 and S7-400 PLC were conducted to evaluate the PLC memory detection performance and performance impact on PLC. The experimental results demonstrate that the proposed system detects all malicious organization block (OB) injection and data block (DB) manipulation, and the increment of PLC cycle time, the impact on PLC performance, was less than 1 ms. The proposed system detects PLC memory attacks with a simpler detection method than earlier studies. Furthermore, the proposed system can be applied to ICS with a small performance impact on PLC.
Source: openalex_inverted_index · Quality: baseline
Research context
OpenAlex topics: Smart Grid Security and Resilience · Security and Verification in Computing · Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
SciVX discovery tags are terminology-based. OpenAlex topics are source-provided classifications.
References (29)
Show source-provided references
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